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ABSTRACT
This paper uses both theory and empirical work to examine the effect of environmental regulations
on trade flows. We develop a simple economic model to demonstrate how unobserved heterogeneity,
endogeneity and aggregation issues bias measurements of the relationship between regulatory costs
and trade. We apply an estimating equation derived from the model to data on U.S. regulations and
net trade flows among the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, for 130 manufacturing industries from 1977
to 1986. Our results indicate that industries whose abatement costs increased most experienced the
largest increases in net imports. For the 20 industries hardest hit by regulation, the change in net
imports we ascribe to the increase in regulatory costs amounts to more than half of the total increase














                                                




1.  Introduction   
  
All sides in recent trade and environmental policy debates seem to share the view that 
regulatory stringency in developed countries shifts polluting industries to the developing world.  
While widely believed, this "pollution haven effect" has proven difficult to demonstrate 
empirically.  Some studies examine individual plant location decisions, while others study 
international trade.  Until recently, neither approach found significant evidence of a pollution 
haven effect.  But most of these used cross-sections of data, making it difficult to control for 
unobserved characteristics of countries or industries that may be correlated with both 
environmental regulations and economic activity.  A few recent studies have used panels of data 
and industry or country fixed effects, and have demonstrated small but statistically significant 
pollution haven effects.
1  This paper employs both theoretical and empirical methods to uncover 
and estimate the magnitude of the pollution haven effect while simultaneously arguing that 
previous efforts suffer from both inadequate accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and from 
the endogeneity of pollution abatement cost measures.   
Explanations for the failure to find a pollution haven effect often point to the small 
fraction of costs represented by pollution abatement.  While it is possible that more stringent 
environmental regulations have a small effect on firms' costs and international competitiveness, 
it seems unlikely that more stringent regulations would have no effect whatsoever.  This 
explanation is further undermined by frequent counter-intuitive empirical results.  Some 
researchers find larger and more significant pollution haven effects for less pollution-intensive 
industries.  A few even find evidence that industries with relatively high pollution abatement 
costs are leading exporters.
2  In these cases, the Porter hypothesis – that regulation brings cost-
 
1 See, for example, List (2003), Becker and Henderson (2000), and Greenstone (2002) for recent papers on plant 
locations, and Ederington and Minier (2003) on international trade.  Jaffe et al. (1995) survey the earlier literature, 
and Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Brunnermeir and Levinson (2004) review the newer studies. 
2 See for example Kalt (1988) , Grossman and Krueger (1993), or Osang and Nandy (2000).     2
                                                
reducing innovation – is often invoked as the explanation for finding a positive link between 
regulatory stringency and exports.
3   
 The current state of empirical work leaves important questions unanswered.  Many trade 
policy analysts express concern that countries may undercut international tariff agreements by 
weakening environmental regulations to placate domestic protectionist interests.  If this is true, 
international trade negotiators may need to close this loophole by placing explicit restrictions on 
the use of domestic environmental policy.  This concern, however, rests on the assumption that 
environmental regulations have significant cost and competitiveness consequences – a disputed 
empirical point. 
In this paper we re-examine the link between abatement costs and trade flows using both 
theory and empirics, in the hope of identifying and accounting for several important econometric 
and data issues.  We believe that these issues – and not the relatively small costs of pollution 
abatement nor the Porter hypothesis – are responsible for the mixed results produced thus far.   
To do so we develop a simple, multi-sector, partial-equilibrium model where each 
manufacturing sector (i.e. a 3-digit SIC industry) is composed of many heterogeneous (4-digit) 
industries.  Sectors can differ in their use of primary factors and in their average pollution 
intensity; one sector’s production could be capital intensive and relatively dirty, while another's 
is labor intensive and relatively clean.  Industries within a sector differ only in their pollution 
intensity, and two-way trade within each 3-digit sector occurs because of these differences.  We 
take factor prices and national incomes as exogenous, and make no attempt to make 
environmental policy endogenous.  We use this simple model for three purposes.   
First, we derive an analytical expression for measured pollution abatement costs as a 
fraction of value-added.  This statistic is widely used as a measure of regulatory stringency in 
empirical work estimating the pollution haven effect.  We show how this measure is 
simultaneously determined with trade flows, and demonstrate how unobserved changes in 
foreign costs, regulations, or domestic industry attributes can produce a spurious negative 
correlation between the sector-wide pollution abatement costs and net imports.  This correlation 
is of course opposite to the direct effect predicted by the pollution haven hypothesis, and 
suggests an explanation for the difficulties encountered by earlier studies.  
 
3 Porter (1995).  
  3
Second, we use the model to derive an estimating equation linking industry net imports to 
domestic and foreign measures of regulations, factor costs and tariffs.  We then estimate the 
pollution haven effect, taking account of the unavailability of many control variables and the 
implications of employing pollution abatement costs as a proxy for direct measures of regulation.   
Third, our use of a theoretical model forces us to be explicit regarding our estimating 
equation’s error term.  We detail the set of conditions a successful instrument must exhibit and 
then construct instrumental variables relying on the geographic distribution of dirty industries 
around the U.S.  Geographic location has of course been used before as a source of exogenous 
variation (see Frankel and Romer (1999) in particular), but here it poses some new challenges 
because of the mobility of industries within the U.S.   
We then estimate the effect of regulations on trade flows using data on U.S. imports in 
133 three-digit manufacturing industries from Mexico and Canada over the 1977-1986 period.  
We are limited in coverage by changes in SIC codes after 1987 and by the discontinuation of the 
pollution abatement cost data.   
Our empirical results consistently show a positive, statistically significant, and 
empirically plausible relationship between industry pollution abatement costs and net imports 
into the U.S.  This is true for imports from both Mexico and Canada.  In our fixed-effects 
estimations we find that a 1 percent increase in pollution abatement costs is associated with a 0.2 
percent increase in net imports from Mexico (or decrease in net exports), and a 0.4 percent 
increase in net imports from Canada.   
Our theoretical model suggests several reasons why these fixed-effects estimates 
mismeasure the pollution haven effect, and in our instrumental variables estimation we find 
larger effects.  The same 1 percent increase in pollution abatement costs predicts a 0.4 percent 
increase in net imports from Mexico and a 0.6 percent increase from Canada.   
To preview the magnitudes of the effects we are finding, consider that the 20 three-digit 
industries whose costs rose most from 1977 to 1986 experienced a 2.7 percentage point increase 
in pollution abatement costs as a share of value added.  According to our fixed-effects results,  
increased environmental costs, on average among these 20 highly affected industries, were 
associated with a $38 million increase in net imports from Mexico.  The instrumental variables   4
                                                
results suggest an $85 million increase.  For comparison, two-way trade with Mexico in these 
same hardest-hit industries rose by an average of $143 million over the period.   
Before describing the details of these estimates, we need to outline a model of trade and 
derive the estimating equation.  Along the way, we will point out biases that may have affected 
previous work using similar data.   
 
2.  A Model of Pollution Costs and Trade 
 
  Consider two countries, "Home" and "Foreign," with foreign attributes denoted by a star 
(*).  Each country has identical technologies.  The model is partial equilibrium, in the sense that 
factor prices and environmental policies in the form of pollution taxes (τ,τ*) are exogenous.  To 
generate a basis for trade arising from differences in regulation, we assume Home has more 
stringent regulations: τ > τ*.   
  In each country there are N  sectors, indexed by i, and within each sector are many 
industries.  Empirically, "sectors" correspond to 3-digit SIC codes and "industries" correspond to 
4-digit SIC codes.
4  We denote output available for sale or consumption in the i-th sector by xi, 
and since each sector contains numerous industries we denote industry output by xi(η), where η 
is an index running from zero to one.  We assume consumers spend a constant fraction of their 
income on goods from each sector with spending shares given by bi .  Consumers spread this 
fraction of spending across all industries within the xi sector uniformly.   
2.1 Technologies and Abatement 
 
  Production is CRS and uses both labor L, and an industry-specific factor Ki.  Production 
of output creates pollution as a byproduct, but firms have access to an abatement technology that 
can be used to reduce emissions.  We assume firms can allocate part of their factor use to 
abatement, and denote this fraction by θ(η).  Production for sale in a typical industry in the xi 
sector is then (dropping the i subscripts for clarity) 
 
 
4 Technically, 3-digit SIC codes are referred to as "industry groups."  We use the term "sector" for convenience.   [ ] ( ) () 1 () () , () XX xF K L η θη η η =−  (2.1) 
 
where F  is increasing, strictly concave, and CRS, and η∈[0,1] labels industries within the xi 
sector.  Given CRS and free entry, total revenue equals total costs, and since there are no 
intermediate goods, value added equals total revenues. This implies θ(η) is the share of pollution 
abatement costs in value added in industry η -- a commonly used empirical measure of 
regulatory costs. 
  Pollution emitted is a function of total output and the abatement intensity θ,  
 
  ( ) ( ) () () () , () XX zF K L η φθη η η =  (2.2) 
 
where φ is a decreasing function of θ.  With no abatement, θ = 0, φ(0)=1, and by choice of units, 
pollution emitted equals output : z = x =F(K,L).  When abatement is active, θ > 0 and pollution is 
reduced.
5   





φ θθ =− , where 0<α<1.  Then, assuming abatement is undertaken, we can employ 
equations (2.1) and (2.2) to write output as if it were produced via a Cobb-Douglas function of 
pollution emitted and traditional factors.  
 
  [ ]
1( ) () () () ( () , () ) . XX xz F KL
αη αη ηη ηη
−
=  (2.3) 
 
Finally, it will be helpful to rank the industries within each sector in terms of their pollution 
intensity, α(η), so that high-η industries are the most pollution-intensive:  () 0 α η ′ > .
6    
 
                                                 
5 See Copeland and Taylor (2003) chapter 2 for a similar model and further details on abatement.   
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6 When pollution taxes are costly relative to abatement inputs, we can both (1) ensure that active abatement occurs 
and (2) extend the ranking on the primitive α(η) to ensure that pollution abatement costs as a fraction of value-
added and emissions per unit of output rise with η.  Since these rankings are important to our empirical work we 
will assume that this is true throughout. 2.2 Within and Across-Sector Trade Patterns 
  
To determine which set of industries is produced at home and abroad, we compare their 
unit costs.  From equation (2.3), the unit cost function for good xi is 
 
  ( )
1( ) () () ()
F ck c
α η αη ηη τ
−
=  (2.4) 
 
where 
(1 ) () ( 1 ) k
α α ηα α
−− ≡−
−  is an industry-specific constant, and c
F= c
F(w,ri ) is the unit cost of 
producing one unit of Fi, assuming the two factors of production (Ki, L) sell at prices (w,ri).
7  A 
similar unit cost function describes foreign costs; hence, if good η is produced at home, free 
entry implies it must sell at price (2.4).  If it is produced abroad, it must sell at  
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The Home country produces and exports all industries η such that c(η) ≤ c*(η).  Industries η are 
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 (2.6) 
Note by construction the left side of (2.6) is independent of η and only varies across sectors.  The 
right side is falling in η because we have assumed τ > τ* and ordered the industries such that 
α(η) is increasing in η.
8
  Figure 1a depicts the basic setup.  The x1 sector faces factor costs c1
F at home and c1
F* 
abroad, and pollution taxes τ and τ*.  The function Γ determines the threshold industry  1 η , 
defined by taking (2.6) with equality and solving to find: 
 
                                                 
7 Since every sector has its own specific factor Ki we can be assured that both countries will be actively producing at 
least some industries in every sector. 
  6
8 To see this, take the log of the right side and differentiate.   ( )
** ,, ,
FF gc c η ττ ≡  (2.7) 
 
Since τ > τ*, Γ is declining and industries to the left of  1 η  have c(η) < c*(η).  These industries 
are produced at home and exported.  Industries to the right of  1 η  have c(η)* < c(η) and are 
produced abroad and imported.  There is two-way trade within this 3-digit sector because of 
differences in comparative advantage at the 4-digit industry level.   
  Having solved for the marginal industry,  i η , we can now write Home net imports 
(imports minus exports) in the xi sector.  Let bi denote the fraction of income spent on xi, and I 
and I* represent home and foreign aggregate incomes respectively.  Home has income I, spends 
the fraction bi on xi, and of this expenditure the fraction 1 i η −  is spent on imported foreign 
goods.  The foreign country likewise spends the fraction bi of income on xi, has income I*, and of 
this expenditure the fraction  i η  is used to purchase Home exports.  Home net imports are thus:  
 
__
Net Imports [1 ] * ii i i i bI bI η η =− −  (2.8) 
Equations (2.7) and (2.8) give us a relationship between trade flows and pollution regulations by 
sector.   
 
  7
By construction the model allows trade flows to reflect both differences in factor 
endowments and regulations.  Differences across countries in their abundance of primary factors, 
capital, land or skilled human capital, will be reflected in the relevant ratio of home to foreign 
costs, (c
F/c
F*), and hence trade patterns.  Sectors may also differ in their pollution intensity so 
that a very dirty sector, J, will have ΓJ  > ΓI for all η, even if firms in both I and J face the same 
pollution taxes.  Despite this, a country with high pollution taxes may still produce and export a 
large fraction of the world’s dirty J goods, and import a large fraction of its I goods, if the 
primary factors used in J are relatively cheap in the tightly regulated country.  By allowing 
sectors to differ in their use of primary factors, we allow for the possibility that tight regulation 
countries produce and export dirty goods.  But to capture the effect of regulation on trade flows 
cleanly, we have assumed that within-sector trade is determined solely by relative pollution 
taxes.  This ensures that within each sector the dirtiest industries are located in the low regulation 
country, and changes in pollution taxes alter the composition of the industries remaining at home in a clear way.  An increase in home pollution taxes decreases Γ() and moves  i η to the left in 
figure 1a, increasing net imports.   
To examine this relationship empirically, we need to derive an estimating equation and 
discuss several data-related complications.  
 
3. From Theory to Estimation 
 
Since sectors differ greatly in size, empirical work typically scales net imports by 
domestic production or value shipped.
9  In our model these are the same, and noting the value of 
domestic production must be bi ηi(I+I*), net imports in the xi industrial sector, scaled by 
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 (3.1) 
where Ni  is net imports over the value of production, and s is Home’s share of world income.  
Net imports in sector i are positive so long as  i s η > ; i.e. Home is a net importer if its share of 
world income exceeds its share of world production in xi. 
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where β0= -1 and  β1=1.  Then we can use (2.7) to rewrite (3.2) as 
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9 This is to ensure that any excluded right-hand-side variable that is correlated with industry size does not 
automatically contaminate the error.  See Leamer and Levinsohn (1996) on this point.   where we have introduced the error εit to reflect both approximation error in linearizing (3.3) and 
standard measurement error in obtaining data on net imports, Nit.   
The only component of foreign costs (c
F*) that we observe empirically is tariffs on 
foreign products, so we include those at the industry level and denote them by (Tit).  We do not 
observe other components of (c
F*) or foreign pollution taxes (τ*).  To capture changes in 
Home’s share of world income st, and any other economy-wide change in the U.S. propensity to 
import, we include a set of unrestricted time dummies (Dt) in our estimation.  In addition, we add 
sector dummies (Di) to control for sector-specific but time-invariant differences in foreign and 
domestic unit costs.  Since we have a relatively short panel, and the stocks of primary factors 
such as physical and human capital that determine (c
F) and (c
F*) are only slowly moving, 
industry fixed effects may capture most if not all unobserved differences in the ratio of home to 
foreign costs.   
While the typical sources of comparative advantage adjust slowly over time, U.S. 
environmental regulations changed dramatically over our sample period, and dramatically 
relative to most trading partners.  Importantly, we do not observe domestic pollution taxes or 
other measures of environmental regulation to represent (τit).  We do however observe pollution 
abatement costs as a fraction of value added (θit).  Making this substitution yields our estimating 
equation: 
 
   (3.5) 
11
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where we note the error term eit contains our original measurement and approximation error 
reported in (3.4), plus any industry-specific time varying elements of the ratio c
F*it/c
F
it  not 
captured by our industry dummies, foreign pollution taxes τit, and measurement error introduced 
by employing θit rather than τit.  This observation raises several econometric issues. 
 
  93.1  Econometric Issues  
 
Because getting direct measures of pollution taxes or industry-specific pollution quotas 
for a broad spectrum of industries is infeasible, researchers have relied on indirect measures of 
stringency such as pollution abatement costs.  To see one major problem with this approach, note 
that total revenues (at producer prices) for any industry in the xi sector are given by p(1-αi)xi.
  
Total pollution abatement costs (PACs) are just a fraction of this given by p(1-αi)xiθ. 
10  To find 
the sector-wide measure of PACs, integrate over all the industries in the xi sector that are active 
in the Home country:  
 
  ()
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Since spending (p(η)x(η)) is a constant fraction (bi), of world income (I+I*), we can simplify the 





























() i i θ η  is the fraction of value added in sector xi that is spent on pollution abatement when 
the Home country produces goods in the range [0,  i η ].   
                                                 
  10
10 Producers pay the fraction α of revenues as pollution taxes (recall (2.4)) hence the producer price, net of tax 
payments, is p(1-α).  From (2.3) we have p(1-α)x=c
FF .  Pollution abatement costs are θc
FF ; hence, pollution 
abatement costs can be written θp(1-α)x.  Pollution abatement costs as a fraction of value added are then just θ. Once we introduce time subscripts, (3.6) is our proxy for τit in (3.5).  Because this 
measure is readily available in the U.S. from the mid-1970s until 1996 it is also the measure of 
regulatory stringency used by numerous studies examining the effect of pollution regulation.   
Unfortunately the measure introduces several significant problems.  To see why, it is useful to 
totally differentiate (3.6) with respect to a generic parameter y.  This generic parameter could be 
anything that affects trade flows across industries: transportation costs, non-tariff barriers, factor 
costs, etc.  With some rearrangement we find variation in measured pollution costs comes from 
two sources.   
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The first source of variation is created by the change in abatement costs of existing domestic 
industries (this is the dθ/dy term integrated over [0,  i η ]).  If the change in y raises pollution 
abatement costs at the industry level, then all the elements in this first integral are positive and 
our sector-wide measure rises.  For example, if y represents the cost of factors used to abate 
pollution, the pollution abatement costs incurred by those industries within sector i increase, and 
our sector-wide measure of pollution costs increases. 
The second source of variation is created by the change in the composition of domestic 
industries (this is the term involving d i η /dy).  The change in y will likely alter the threshold 
industry  i η .  Since θ(η) is increasing in η the integral in this second term is positive and hence 
the sign of this term hinges on d i η /dy.  Measured pollution abatement costs rise when  i η  rises 
because in this case relatively more polluting industries are being produced at home, rather than 
imported.  This raises average pollution intensity and pollution abatement costs at the sector 
 
  11level.  It is this second term, the effect of changes in the composition of the sector, that causes 
econometric problems.  Loosely, the problems can be labeled "unobserved heterogeneity," 
"unobserved foreign regulations," and "aggregation bias." 
3.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity  
 
  One obvious problem confronting empirical work in this literature is the likelihood of 
unobserved but fixed characteristics of states/industries/countries that are correlated with both 
the propensity to export and to pollute.  As our derivation of (3.5) makes clear, researchers 
typically have only a subset of the potentially relevant covariates, and this makes unobserved 
heterogeneity a key problem.  The biases involved in the effect of unobserved factors on 
measured pollution costs θi , calculated in (3.7), exacerbate this problem. 
To demonstrate, suppose we compare two sectors, x1 and x2 , depicted in figure 1a.  
Assume that they face the same pollution taxes, are equally dirty, and have identical costs at 
home given by c1
F
 = c2
F.  They are observably equivalent to the econometrician, but assume 
production of x2 in the foreign country is relatively cheaper than x1.  That is, c1
F*> c2
F*.  Again 
use (3.7) but now let dy be replaced by the change in foreign costs across sectors at a point in 
time.  Foreign pollution taxes have no direct effect on home pollution abatement costs, and hence 
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⎠  (3.8) 
measured pollution abatement costs will be higher in sector 1 than in sector 2 because 
__
12 η η > .  
This is because sector 2 has higher net imports, and the dirtiest industries in sector 2 are 
imported, and not counted in domestic pollution costs.  Since foreign costs are unknown, we only 
observe that sector x1 has higher pollution abatement costs and lower net imports than x2 – a 
seeming contradiction of a negative link between environmental control costs and 
competitiveness. 
  12 
  13
                                                
  Note that (3.8) establishes a theoretical rationale for a positive covariance between 
foreign costs of production and home pollution abatement costs, and this suggests the coefficient 
on the pollution cost coefficient is downwardly biased.  In fact, there is some evidence of this 
symptom in existing work.  Grossman and Krueger’s (1993) original study of NAFTA found a 
negative and significant relationship between pollution abatement costs and imports in some of 
their cross-section regressions.  And several studies have reported a smaller coefficient on 
pollution cost variables in resource-intensive or dirty industries than in other industries; i.e. 
coefficients are smaller in just those industries where unmeasured industry-specific factors may 
loom large in determining production costs.   
To show that this is a real concern in our data, consider Canada and Mexico (since it is 
clear that these countries differ in comparative advantage vis-à-vis the U.S.).  In table 1 we 
describe pollution abatement costs and net imports from Canada and Mexico for various groups 
of U.S. industries, for the period 1977-86.  In the top panel of the table we report that the 20 
sectors (3-digit SIC codes) with the lowest pollution abatement operating costs (PAOC) spent 
0.12 percent of their value added on abatement.  By contrast, the 20 sectors with the highest 
PAOC spent 4.8 percent.  But column 2 of the table clearly shows that net imports from Mexico 
are higher in those industries with lower abatement costs, although this difference is not 
statistically significant.  For Canada, the pattern is reversed.  Column 3 shows that the U.S. 
imports from Canada significantly more goods with high pollution abatement costs.   
The top panel of table 1 thus seems to imply that the U.S. imports pollution-intensive 
goods from a rich country (with ostensibly tight regulation) and clean goods from a poor 
developing country (with presumably lax regulation), belying a link between environmental 
control costs and international competitiveness.  Most likely, these correlations reflect the fact 
that Canada has an unobserved comparative advantage in natural resource industries that are 
relatively pollution intensive, while Mexico has an unobserved comparative advantage in labor-
intensive and relatively clean industries.
11  But this trade pattern prediction is not inconsistent 
with the result that increases in U.S. pollution abatement costs, ceteris paribus, raise net imports 
from both countries at the margin: a pollution haven effect.   
 
11 If true, this would fit the results of Antweiler et al. (2001) who argue that other motives for trade, in particular 
capital abundance, more than offset the effect of pollution regulations, leading rich developed countries to have a 
comparative advantage in many dirty-good industries.   To confirm this, in the bottom panel of table 2 we present the change in net imports for 
the 20 sectors whose pollution abatement costs increased least from 1977 to 1986, compared 
with those whose pollution costs increased most.  In contrast to the top panel, the sectors whose 
pollution costs increased most saw the largest increase in net imports from both Canada and 
Mexico.  Though statistically significant only for Canada, these results suggest a link between 
higher environmental control costs and increased net imports, whereas the top panel suggested 
the opposite.  
Table 1 only confirms that unobserved heterogeneity drives much of the differences in 
trade patterns across industries.  The problem highlighted by equation (3.8) and figure 1a is that 
those unobserved industry differences will bias empirical findings against finding a pollution 
haven effect. 
3.3  Unobserved Foreign Environmental Regulation 
 
Next consider the empirical consequences of not observing foreign pollution taxes.  
Equation (3.6) demonstrated that θit is function of the threshold  i η  .  Meanwhile, the threshold is 
a function of unobserved foreign pollution taxes, τit* (recall (2.7)).  Consequently, the error eit in 
(3.5) is almost surely correlated with the right-hand-side variable θit  making estimation by OLS 
biased and inconsistent.  To investigate the direction of the bias, consider (3.7).  Again, foreign 
pollution taxes have no direct effect on home pollution abatement costs and dθ(η)/dτ* = 0.  The 
first term in (3.7) is zero.  But when foreign pollution taxes rise, the home country begins 
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⎠  (3.9) 
Measured sector-wide pollution abatement costs rise when foreign pollution taxes rise.
12  But 
from (3.1), we can conclude that when  i η  rises net imports fall.  Unobserved foreign pollution 
                                                 
  14
12 In a full general equilibrium setting with endogenous policy setting, both Home factor costs and pollution taxes 
may vary, which would add additional terms to consider.  These complications would not, however, eliminate the 
term discussed here.   taxes introduce a negative correlation between pollution abatement costs and net imports.  More 
concretely, if home and foreign pollution taxes were the only time-varying determinants of net 
imports we could then use the standard omitted variable formula to conclude that β4 in (3.4) is 
biased downward, because β5 is negative and (3.9) establishes a positive covariance between the 
measure of home stringency and unobserved foreign pollution taxes.  Whether this covariance is 
positive in the data is unknown; nevertheless, our discussion provides a suggestive explanation 
for the small or even counterintuitive signs found on pollution costs in previous research. 
 
3.4  Aggregation bias  
 
  A third problem with estimating (3.5) arises from the fact that the unit of observation (3-
digit sectors) is a heterogeneous mix of 4-digit industries.
13  This heterogeneity means that when 
pollution taxes rise at home and raise production costs, some of the industries lose out to foreign 
competition and shut down.  If the industries most sensitive to pollution taxes are in fact the 
dirtiest, then measured sector-wide pollution abatement costs fall from this change in the 
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 (3.10) 
The direct effect of an increase in the pollution tax is that industries at home respond by abating 
more pollution, devoting a larger share of output to abatement, and increasing θ(η) for each 




13 We recognize, of course, that 3-digit SIC codes aggregate 4-digit industries that are heterogeneous in many ways, 
not only pollution intensities.  The econometric issues we describe here would apply equally if we were trying to 
estimate, say, the effect of labor standards or capital costs on trade, and aggregating across industry groups with 
different levels of labor and capital intensities.  We can only hope that differences in these other characteristics are 
of second order, relative to the changes in pollution regulations that occurred from 1977 to 1986, and that they can 
be absorbed by the industry fixed effects. quantity demanded by foreigners.  This is the first element in (3.10) and it raises θi in equation 
(3.6).  This first (positive) element tells us what the measured change in sector-wide pollution 
abatement costs would be if we held constant the composition of industries.   
There is, however, a second effect, which is depicted in figure 1b.  The increase in the 
pollution tax lowers the function Γ, and as a consequence there is a new lower threshold industry 
η %.  Industries between η % and η  are now imported rather than being produced domestically.  
Since these industries were the dirtiest produced in the xi sector, this second effect is negative 
and it works to lower θi in equation (3.6).
14  Pollution abatement costs in xi have fallen, and net 
imports have risen, another seeming violation of the pollution haven hypothesis.  
  This second effect is essentially a form of endogeneity.  Studies seeking to measure the 
effect of pollution costs on trade inadvertently also capture the effect of trade on measured 
pollution costs.
15   
  To demonstrate this aggregation bias, in figure 2 we plot pollution abatement operating 
costs per dollar of value added in the U.S. manufacturing sector over 1974-1994.  These plots 
compare 
_
() it it θ η  from (3.6) where we allow industry composition within the i-th sector to vary, 
with   where industry composition is fixed within the i-th sector.  Our analysis of (3.10) 
tells us that rising home pollution taxes lower measured sector-wide costs by altering the 
composition of the remaining industry (i.e. the second term is strictly negative).  By fixing the 
composition of industry we should observe higher sector-wide pollution abatement costs, as we 
are then only measuring the first term.  
_
1974 ( it i θη )
                                                
  The bottom line in figure 2 shows the aggregate value for the entire manufacturing sector.  
It rises sharply through the late 1970s, and then remains relatively flat.  Note, however, that if the 
composition of U.S. manufacturing shifted away from polluting industries, this bottom line 
understates what pollution abatement costs would have been had all industries remained as they 
were in 1974.  To see this, the second line in figure 2 plots pollution abatement operating costs, 
 
14 There may be conditions under which the second term is sufficiently negative as to make the overall derivative 
negative.  We have not pursued this possibility, because the existence of the second negative term is sufficient to 
generate an aggregation bias. 
  16
15 In general though, the direction of this bias is unclear.  In our model, an increase in pollution costs causes the most 
pollution-intensive industries to move abroad, reducing the average pollution costs of the industries remaining at 
home, but it is unclear whether this is true in the data.  For example, some very dirty natural resource industries may 
have little or no international mobility whereas relatively clean assembling operations may move quite easily.    
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divided by value added, where the composition of U.S. industries by 2-digit SIC code is held 
constant as of 1974.  This line is higher because U.S. manufacturing has shifted towards less 
polluting 2-digit industries.  Similarly, the third line holds the industrial composition constant at 
the 3-digit SIC code level.  It is higher still because within each 2-digit industry, the composition 
has shifted towards less-polluting three-digit industries.  We strongly suspect, but cannot prove 
because of data limitations, that a similar process is at work at the 4-digit level making our 3-
digit sector-wide measures similarly suspect.  Furthermore, the problem cannot be solved by 
disaggregating, because any practical industry definition will include heterogeneous sub-
industries that differ in their pollution intensities and their propensity to be imported. 
Figure 2 shows why pollution haven effects are so difficult to observe.  Aggregate 
measures of pollution abatement costs per dollar of value added understate the rise in regulatory 
stringency in the U.S., because the composition of output has become relatively cleaner over 
time.  While we cannot say that this change in composition is due solely to rising U.S. pollution 
control costs, the change in composition alone poses a major problem for research on the effect 
of environmental costs on trade: industries whose regulations increased most are increasingly 
likely to be imported, which then lowers measured increases in pollution costs.  Researchers 
trying to estimate the effect of costs on trade can be misled by the effect of trade on measured 
costs.  
 
4.  Instruments 
 
  The preceding section has detailed the problems involved in estimating (3.5):  
unobserved heterogeneity, unobserved foreign pollution taxes, and aggregation bias.  
Unobserved heterogeneity is a well-recognized pitfall, and is typically solved by including 
industry or country fixed effects, depending on the unit of analysis.
16  Given our panel, we 
include time and industry fixed effects to soak up unobserved industry-specific or time-specific 
excluded variables.  Many of the unobservable industry characteristics are very slow moving, 
 
16 Of course, that implies that researchers have access to a panel of data over many years, something that is not 
always true.  Several researchers have taken this approach, and the results often do support a modest pollution haven 
effect.  See, for example, Ederington and Minier (2003), Ederington et al. (2004).  including sources of comparative advantage that attract pollution-intensive industries: 
geographic proximity to markets, sources of raw materials, etc.  By looking at changes in net 
imports as a function of changes in pollution abatement costs, we can difference out the 
unobservable effects of industry characteristics that remain constant.   
To address the other two problems, we adopt an instrumental variables approach.
17  It is 
clear that our instrument must have both time and industry variation; it must be correlated with 
sector-wide pollution abatement cost measures; and it must be uncorrelated with the industry-
specific time varying elements left in eit..  Using (3.6) and (2.7) we can write sector-wide 
pollution abatement costs more generally as:  
 
  ( )
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Since domestic cost, foreign costs, and foreign taxes are unobserved, any time and industry-
specific component of these is left in our error.  Therefore, our instrument must create 
independent variation in abatement costs by altering the home country's pollution regulation.   
To find instruments we proceed in several steps.  First, we note that standard theories of 
regulation relate the stringency of regulation to the income levels of affected parties, the current 
level of pollution, and tastes.  Hence, variation in income levels, pollutant emissions or tastes are 
possible candidates.
18  However, these characteristics are not industry-specific.  The second step 
then is to transform these aggregate characteristics into useful instruments with time and industry 
variation.  To do so we employ two facts and make one assumption.  The first fact is that much 
of U.S. environmental policy is set by states.  As a result, variation in state-level regulation will 
affect pollution abatement costs.  The second fact is that the distribution of industries across 
states is not uniform: different industries are concentrated in different parts of the country.  A 
consequence of these two facts is that some industries are predominantly located in stringent 
states and face high pollution abatement costs; other industries are located in lax states and face 
low abatement costs.   
                                                 
17 Ederington and Minier (2003) also instrument for environmental regulatory stringency in a paper that focuses on 
environmental regulations as a strategic substitute for trade restrictions.  
  18
18 See for example, Copeland and Taylor (2003, chapter 2).     To construct our instruments, for each industry we take a weighted average of state 
characteristics (qs), where the weights are the industry's value added in the various states (vis) at 
the beginning of the sample period.  By using beginning-of-period weights, all variation over 
time comes from changes in state characteristics.  More concretely, for the 48 contiguous U.S. 
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where qst is the characteristic of state s in year t, vis,77 is the value added by industry i in state s in 
1977, and   is the sum of the value added of industry i across all 48 contiguous 









   To be a good instrument Ii must be correlated with the pollution abatement costs facing 
the xi sector, while simultaneously being uncorrelated with the error eit in (3.5).  Take as given 
that the state characteristic qst is strongly related to state-level regulations and hence pollution 
abatement costs.  And now recall that the error term in (3.5) contains measurement and 




foreign pollution taxes τit, and measurement error introduced by employing θit rather than τit.  
Since we have included both time and industry dummies, only the time-varying and industry-
specific elements of these unobserved variables remain in our error term.  Therefore, whether our 
instruments are valid relies on there being zero covariance between the remaining industry-
specific and time varying elements of eit and Iit.  Since Iit is just a (fixed) linear function of state 
characteristics, this simplifies to requiring that at each t we have cov(eit, qst) = 0 for all s.  In turn 
this requires an assumption:  
 
Assumption 1. Industry-specific shocks to costs, tariffs, foreign pollution taxes etc. that alter 
home industry production are not large enough to induce a change in the stringency of 
environmental policy in the states in which this industry resides.  
 
Assumption 1 is basically a small industry assumption.  If it holds, then industry-specific and 
time-varying shocks in each industry alter net imports in that industry, but do not affect 
environmental stringency.  We assume that states set the stringency of their regulations weighing 
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the marginal benefits and costs of tighter regulation.  A beneficial shock to industry i will raise 
the demand for its output and its derived demand for pollution; but if this industry’s share of 
emissions is small in this state then the aggregate demand for pollution is virtually unchanged.  
Industry-specific shocks then have no effect on pollution demand.  
If this industry is also small in providing income to state residents, then the shock will 
have a negligible effect on state incomes as well and hence no impact on marginal damage.  
Pollution supply is then unaffected by industry-specific shocks.  If the industry is small in both 
of these senses, then environmental stringency can be thought of as being independent of 
industry-specific shocks.   
  What are good candidates for the exogenous variation we need to alter pollution 
abatement costs?  We exploit two basic sources of exogenous variation.  The first arises when a 
set of industries (other than the i-th) experiences a shock.  For example, suppose foreign costs 
rise in some set of industries we denote by J, and this stimulates output in those sectors.  This 
shock raises the competitive margin in the set of J industries, shifts pollution demand to the right 
and raises pollution taxes for the i-th sector.  Abatement costs in the i-th industry rise because of 
the shock in the j-th.   
  To construct this instrument we need to construct measures of pollutants emitted in each 
state by all industries.  The World Bank has estimated the pollution emissions per dollar of value 
added for each SIC code in the U.S. manufacturing sector, for 14 different air, water, and solid 
waste pollutants (Hettige et al., 1994).  We use these figures to estimate the total emissions of 
each of the 14 pollutants in each state, based on each industry's value added in each state in each 
year.  This gives us 14 instruments, where we are careful to exclude industry i’s contribution in 
its own instrument.  Industries with a high value of this instrument for a given pollutant are 
located in states with a large amount of that pollutant being generated by other 3-digit industries.  
  Formally, the instrument works as follows.  For a given pollutant E, say airborne 
particulates, we take the total amount predicted to be emitted in state s by all industries except 
industry i.  That gives us the amount of pollution in state s at time t due to other industries.  (This 
is the term in brackets in (4.2) below.)  Then we take a weighted average of all 48 contiguous 
states, where the weights are industry i's value added in each state in 1977.  That gives us our instrument, a measure of the amount of pollutant E contributed by other industries in the states in 




















Industries that locate in states with lots of pollution caused by other industries will have high 
values of this instrument, and vice versa.  Since the World Bank cover 14 pollutants, we 
calculate a version of (4.2) for each. 
Our second instrument is based on pollution supply rather than pollution demand.  State 
incomes vary over time because of ongoing technological progress and factor accumulation 
which we take as exogenous to developments in industry i.  These gains may occur in services, 
real estate, transportation, mining, agriculture or in other manufacturing industries.  To the extent 
that these changes raise state incomes they will affect the demand for a clean environment 
(pollution supply).  Formally, we take a weighted average of the incomes per capita in the states, 



















Industries located in states whose incomes are growing faster will have values of this instrument 
that increase over time.   
 
4.1 When might the instruments fail?  
 
 
  This discussion suggests our instruments can fail in a couple of ways.  First, our "small 
industry" assumption may be untrue if any single industry can have a significant effect on the 
aggregate demand or supply of pollution.  If changes in the industry's size affect state 
environmental policy, then the instrument fails.  To investigate this possibility, as a robustness 
test of our instruments we identify those industries that represent more than 3 percent of gross 
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state product in any state, and eliminate those states from the construction of the instruments for 
those industries.   
Second, the geographic dispersion of industries among U.S. states may not be exogenous 
with respect to trade.  Trade agreements and falling transportation costs may make locations 
closer to borders more attractive over time, and industries may move to border states in order to 
trade with Mexico and Canada.  If dirty and clean industries differ in their mobility, then there 
may be a dirty-industry specific but time-varying element to our error term.  Since the 
instruments are constructed using 1977 weights, the movement of industry to take advantage of 
proximity is not in itself a problem for our instruments.  The problem arises if the movement of 
industries is large so that states respond by changing environmental policies.  In that case, the 
increase in stringency in border states would be correlated with the improved competitiveness of 
industries located there.   
To lessen this concern, when studying trade with Mexico, we calculate the instrument using 
states that do not border Mexico.  Similarly, when studying trade with Canada, we calculate the 
instrument using only states that do not border Canada.  
 
5.  Data 
 
  Data on imports and exports to and from the U.S. come from the Center for International 
Data (CID) maintained by Feenstra (1996, 1997) at UC Davis.
19  These data are collected by the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, and are organized by industry according to the international 
Harmonized Commodity and Coding System.  The CID has matched these data with the 
appropriate SIC codes.  Thus for each industry and for each country with which the U.S. trades 
we know the value of exports, the customs value of imports, and the total duties paid. 
  Data on pollution abatement costs come from the U.S. Census Bureau's Pollution 
Abatement Costs and Expenditures survey (PACE).  The PACE data report the annual pollution 
abatement operating costs, including payments to governments, by industry.  These data are 
published in Current Industrial Reports: Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures, MA-200. 
 
19 The CID can be found at http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/.  
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  In constructing the data set for this analysis, we confronted two significant obstacles.  
The first involves the breakdown of published pollution abatement costs into capital costs and 
operating costs.  The Census Bureau published both, but the capital cost data pose numerous 
problems.  The PACE capital data are for new investment, not annualized costs.  Puzzlingly, 
abatement capital expenditures declined significantly as a share of value added, from around 0.8 
percent in 1975 to 0.2 percent in 1984.  There are several potential explanations.  One is, of 
course, the aggregation bias discussed above.  If environmental regulations cause polluting 
industries to relocate overseas, then investment in pollution control equipment could easily 
decline in the U.S.  A second explanation involves the type of capital.  In the early years of 
pollution laws, most abatement capital consisted of "end-of-pipe" technologies.  Over time, 
however, abatement investment becomes increasingly difficult to disentangle from production 
process changes that have little to do with pollution abatement.  Finally, many environmental 
regulations grandfather existing sources of pollution, and this has the effect of stifling new 
abatement expenditures in exactly those industries most strictly regulated.  For all these reasons, 
we focus on PACE operating costs, while noting that this is only an imperfect proxy for the full 
costs of regulation.   
  The second significant data problem involves the definition of an industry.  In 1987 the 
SIC codes were substantially changed, making time-series comparisons difficult.  Six of the 3-
digit codes defined as of 1972 were eliminated, and 3 new codes added.  The total number of 3-
digit SIC codes declined from 143 to 140.  Of the 3-digit codes that remained, 37 were altered by 
changing the definition of manufacturing industries within them.  
  Some papers attempt to span the change in SIC codes in 1987 by applying published 
concordances, so that the pre-1987 data are listed according to post-1987 SIC codes, or vice 
versa.
20  These are typically based on total output as of 1987, when the Census Bureau collected 
the data using both SIC categorizations.  Two major problems arise under this methodology.  
First, while one may be able to attribute x percent of the output of industry i to industry j using 
such a concordance, that percentage will not likely apply to pollution abatement expenditures.  
So converting the post-1987 pollution abatement data to the pre-1987 SIC codes will inevitably 
 
20 For example,  Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (1996) maintain such a concordance at www.nber.org/nberces.   24
                                                
attribute some pollution expenditures to the wrong industries.  Second, the 1987 concordance 
becomes increasingly irrelevant as industries change over time.  So while x percent of industry i's 
output may be attributable to industry j in 1987, that will not likely be true by 1994. 
Consequently, we have limited our study to the 1977-1986 period.  This is the period of fastest 
growth in pollution abatement operating costs. 
 
6.  Empirical Results 
  
  The first, and simplest, implication of our discussion so far is that cross-section 
regressions of net imports on pollution abatement costs may be biased by unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Fixed effects easily solve this. 
6.1  Fixed Effects  
 
   In table 3 we present versions of equation (3.5), the regression analog to the differences 
of means at the top of table 1.  In column (1) the dependent variable is net imports from Mexico 
divided by valued shipped in the U.S.  The pollution costs coefficient is large and statistically 
significant, suggesting that those industries in which pollution abatement costs increased also 
saw increased imports from Mexico.  Column (2) of table 4 presents the same specification 
except that the dependent variable is net imports from Canada.  In both cases we find a positive 
relationship between pollution abatement costs and net imports.  In addition, import tariffs lower 
net imports, although the coefficients are not statistically significant.   
  Overall these results are sensible – increases in abatement costs raise net imports and 
tariffs reduce them.  This is a departure from much of the literature that uses cross-sections of 
data and finds no evidence of a pollution haven effect.
21  
To get a feel for the magnitudes involved note that a one percentage-point increase in the 
share of pollution abatement costs in an industry leads to a 0.064 percentage-point increase in net 
imports from Mexico and a 0.53 percentage-point increase from Canada.  Although the Canada 
coefficient is eight times as large as that for Mexico, imports from Canada were seven times 
 
21 We have also run cross-section versions of table 3 without industry fixed effects and reproduced the lack of 
evidence for a pollution haven effect.  Coefficients on pollution costs are either small and statistically insignificant, 
or are negative.    
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imports from Mexico during this period, so the Canada coefficient represents an effect of 
comparable magnitude.   
  The average 3-digit industry in the U.S. imported from Mexico 0.32 percent of the total 
value of U.S. shipments, and exported to Mexico 0.49 percent (resulting in the net import share 
of -0.1 percent reported in table 2.B).  If the change in net imports measured by the pollution cost 
coefficient of 0.064 in table 3 comes entirely from changing gross imports, the relevant elasticity 
is 0.22.  (This corresponds to ξ1 in equation A.2.  See the appendix for details of these elasticity 
calculations.)  On the other hand, if the change comes entirely from gross exports, the relevant 
elasticity is about 0.17  (ξ2 in equation (A.3)).    
  For imports from Canada, the fixed-effects coefficient in column (2) of table 4 
corresponds to an elasticity 0.45 if the change in trade comes entirely from imports, and 0.32 if 
the change comes from exports.  Note that for Mexico, the elasticity based on imports is larger 
than that based on exports (ξ1>ξ2), while for Canada the reverse is true.  This is because the U.S. 
is a net exporter to Mexico, and a net importer from Canada. 
We should note that for most industries, the share of pollution abatement costs did not 
increase even one percentage point from 1977 to 1986.  In fact, table 1 shows that the 20 
industries where pollution abatement costs increased the most experienced an average increase of 
only 2.7 percentage points.  Only 9 industries experienced increases larger than 2 percentage 
points.
22  As a useful upper bound we can calculate the change in net imports predicted for the 20 
industries where costs rose most.  Using the coefficients from table 3, the 2.7 percentage-point 
increase in costs translates into an average increase in net imports from Mexico of approximately 
$38 million per year in these worst-hit industries.
23  The same calculation for Canada predicts an 
increase in net imports of $312 million per year.   
These adjustments are not small, but they only occur in the hardest-hit industries.  We 
should also recall that trade in these industries can be very large.  In these same 20 hardest-hit 
 
22 The 9 industries are SIC codes 214 (tobacco stemming and redrying), 266 (building paper and board mills), 286 
(industrial organic chemicals), 287 (agricultural chemicals), 291 (petroleum refining), 311 (leather tanning and 
finishing), 331 (blast furnace, basic steel prod.), 333 (primary nonferrous metals), and 334 (secondary nonferrous 
metals). 
23 To calculate this figure we used the average value shipped in these industries over the whole time period to 
convert the change in net imports/value shipped to the change in net imports.  Multiply .064 (from table 3) with .027 
(the change over the whole sample, from table 1) times 21 billion dollars (the average value shipped over the 
sample) to get the figure in the text.      26
industries, average two-way trade grew by $143 million per year between Mexico and the U.S., 
and by $595 million between Canada and the U.S.  All of these calculations are summarized in 
appendix table A1. 
  While the fixed-effects estimates in table 3 appear more reasonable to us than the cross-
section or pooled estimates in the earlier literature, there are still reasons to believe the 
coefficients misstate the true effect of pollution costs on imports.  First, the statistical 
endogeneity of the pollution cost variable, due to its aggregation across different industries, 
means that even the fixed-effects regressions in table 3 are likely biased against finding a 
pollution haven effect.  Second, the fixed-effects regressions assume implicitly that unobserved 
industry characteristics that simultaneously affect tariffs, pollution abatement, and imports are 
fixed over time.  While it is reasonable to imagine that this is true for some industry 
characteristics (location, geography, natural resource abundance), for others it is surely false.  
For these reasons, we turn to instrumental variables estimates of the pollution haven effect. 
 
6.2  Instrumental Variables  
 
  Table 4 presents first-stage regressions in which pollution abatement operating costs as a 
share of value added (the right-hand side variable in table 3) is regressed on tariffs, a year trend, 
130 industry fixed effects, and the instruments.  The first column excludes states that border 
Mexico, the second column excludes states that border Canada, and for comparison the third 
column includes all 48 contiguous U.S. states.   
  Note that because the first stage includes industry and year fixed effects, the coefficients 
in table 4 can be interpreted as the result of changes in the underlying variables.  Industries 
facing higher tariffs tend to have increasing abatement costs.  Industries concentrated in states 
whose incomes grew fastest tend to have pollution abatement costs that grew less fast.  (This 
could be due, for example, to national pollution regulations forcing less stringent states to catch 
up with the leaders.)  And for the most part, industries located in states with growing  
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concentrations of other polluting industries tend to have declining relative pollution abatement 
costs, though some of the pollution coefficients are positive.
24  
The final two columns of table 3 contain two-stage least-squares (2SLS) versions of the 
fixed-effects regressions in columns (1) and (2), where the first stage constitutes estimates of θit 
as a function of the exogenous variables, from table 4.  For Mexico, instrumenting for pollution 
costs increases the coefficient from 0.064 to 0.144.  For Canada the coefficient increases from 
0.529 to 0.792.   
To interpret these coefficients we again need to discuss their magnitudes.  We can use our 
previous example and examine the 20 industries where costs rose most -- by 2.7 percentage 
points.  Using the Mexico coefficient in column (3) of 0.144, these industries are predicted to 
average an $82 million increase in net imports.
25  During the period, trade volume with Mexico 
in these 20 industries increased by an average of $143 million.  The same calculation for Canada 
predicts an increase in net imports of  $453 million, while trade volume grew by $595 million.  
For Mexico, the predicted increase in net imports due to increased pollution costs is 58 percent 
of the increase in trade volume in these 20 industries over the period;  for Canada it is 76 percent.   
Again, it is important to remember that these effects, while large, occur only among the 
industries with the largest environmental cost increases.  The average U.S. manufacturing 
industry saw its pollution costs increase only 0.64 percentage points, leading to predicted 
increases in net imports of $14 million from Mexico, and $79 million from Canada.  These 
figures amount to about 10 percent of the change in trade volume over this period.  (See 
appendix table A1.)   
 
6.3  Robustness checks 
 
  To test the robustness of these estimates, particularly with respect to the instruments, we 
ran a series of standard tests.  First, note that in table 4, F-tests of the joint significance of all of 
the instruments are high.  Second, in table 5 we estimate the 2SLS models with alternate sets of 
 
24 The instruments in table 3 are highly collinear.  Note, for example that criterion air pollutants (SO2, NO2, CO and 
VOCs) all have correlations greater than 0.9.  
25 The calculation is (0.144)(0.027)($21 billion).   28
                                                
instruments.  The original coefficients are reproduced in the top row.  Row (2) drops the state 
incomes from the first-stage, relying only on state pollution levels as instruments.  The pollution 
abatement cost coefficient for Mexico shrinks, but remains much larger than the fixed effects 
estimate.  The Canada coefficient is unaffected by dropping incomes.   
  We have also tried dropping all of the 14 measures of state pollution levels, one-by-one.  
These results are reported in appendix table A2.  The pollution abatement cost coefficients are all 
similar to those in the base specification in table 4, statistically significant, and much larger than 
the analogous fixed-effects coefficients.   
  In each case where we have dropped instruments from the first stage, we have also tried 
including those dropped variables as regressors in the second stage.  None of them (income nor 
any of the 14 pollutants) were statistically significant predictors of trade. 
  Another concern might be that our "small industry" assumption is violated, and that our 
instrumental variables results are driven by the few industries that are highly concentrated in a 
few states.  In that case, the instrumented pollution costs might be endogenous.  In row (3) we 
drop from the instrument stage those state-industry combinations where the industry comprises 
more than 3 percent of gross state product.
26  If anything, this change renders the pollution 
coefficients larger than when all industries are included. 
  In row (4) we include the Mexico border states in the calculation of the instruments in 
column (1), and the Canada border states in the calculation in column (2).  (Recall that the border 
states were dropped to alleviate concerns that industries may move to border states in order to 
trade with Mexico or Canada.)  The Mexico coefficient shrinks, but remains large, statistically 
significant, and larger than its fixed-effects counterpart.  The Canada coefficient becomes even 
larger once the border states are included.   
  Yet another concern involves the fact that the 1970s and early 1980s saw rising energy 
prices.  Since the U.S. is an oil importer, and Mexico and Canada are exporters, one might be 
concerned that polluting industries are also energy-intensive industries, and that changes in trade 
patterns we are attributing to pollution abatement costs really arise from oil prices.  Our 2SLS 
specification should eliminate this concern, unless state characteristics are affected by oil prices 
and in turn affect state pollution stringency.  To be sure, however, in row (5) of table 5 we have 
 
26 Of the 133 industries in 48 states, there were 451 cases where the industry was this large, or 7 percent of the 
sample.    
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included interactions between average annual crude oil prices and the industry fixed effects.
  The 
results hardly differ from the basic specification in row (1). 
  In every alternative specification, the 2SLS pollution coefficients are large, statistically 
significant, and larger than the fixed-effects coefficients.  We conclude from this that the fixed-
effects coefficients typically understate the actual effect of pollution abatement costs on imports 
  In addition to the alternate instrument sets, we performed a test of the overidentifying 
restrictions (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).  This consists of regressing the residuals from the 
second stage regression on the set of instruments, and examining the test statistic (nR
2).  Under 
the null hypothesis that the specification is correct and the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error term eit  in equation (3.5), this test statistic is distributed Chi-squared.  This is the test that 
all of these sets of instruments fail.  The results are reported at the bottom of table 3.  Although 
we cannot assert that we have precisely estimated the structural effect of pollution costs on 
imports, we feel that the fixed-effects and instrumental variables regressions in table 3 
demonstrate the bias associated with cross-section regressions of trade on pollution costs, and 





  Recent research on the effects of pollution regulations on trade has generated mixed 
results.  Most studies using cross-sections of data are unable to disentangle the simultaneous 
effects of industry characteristics on both trade and abatement costs.  As a result, pollution 
abatement costs are often found to have no effect on trade flows; in some cases costs appear to 
promote exports.  This uncertainty is unfortunate because without firm evidence linking 
environmental control costs to trade flows, it is difficult to know whether governments have the 
ability – let alone the motivation – to substitute environmental policy for trade policy.   
  In this paper, we use a simple theoretical model to examine the statistical and theoretical 
sources of endogeneity that confront attempts to measure the effect of environmental regulations 
on trade flows.  We show that for very simple reasons unrelated to pollution havens, pollution   30
abatement costs and net imports may be negatively correlated in panels of industry-level data.  
This negative correlation can easily bias estimates against finding a pollution haven effect. 
In the empirical work, we first estimate a fixed-effects model and show that those 
industries whose abatement costs increased most have seen the largest relative increases in net 
imports.  We then use our model to demonstrate several reasons why the fixed-effects estimates 
are likely to understate the pollution haven effect.  We develop a set of instruments based on the 
geographic dispersion of industries across U.S. states, and estimate 2SLS versions of the same 
estimating equation.  The 2SLS estimates are consistently and robustly larger than the fixed-
effects estimates. 
  Not only are the estimated effects of pollution costs on net imports positive and 
statistically significant, they are economically significant.  For each country group studied, for 
the industries whose pollution abatement costs increased most, the increase in net imports due to 
increased pollution costs represents a considerable fraction of the increase in total trade volumes 
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 Appendix:  Magnitudes as elasticities. 
 
  The fixed-effect pollution abatement cost coefficient in column (1) of table 3 suggests 
that a one percentage-point increase in the share of value added going to pollution costs is 
associated with a 0.064 percentage point increase in net imports as a share of U.S. value shipped.  
Is this large?  It is somewhat difficult to think about elasticity calculations for net imports.  
Consider two hypothetical industries: Industry A has gross imports of $2 million and gross 
exports of $1 million; Industry B has gross imports of $1 billion and gross exports of  $999 
million.  Each has net imports of $1 million.  An increase in pollution costs that causes net 
imports in both industries to increase to $2 million represents a large effect on industry A, and a 
small effect on industry B.  Hence the elasticity of net imports is not a useful tool for comparing 
these coefficients.
27  We need a unit-free measure of the responsiveness of trade to pollution 
costs that is not sensitive to the initial size of net imports, but is comparable across industries 
with very different levels of gross imports and exports.   
  The main analysis here, in equation (3.5),  regresses net imports divided by value shipped 
(N) on pollution abatement divided by value added and other covariates. 
 ... ... it it it it it NMX a e θ ≡−= ++ +   
To interpret  ˆ α , divide it into two terms: 







If we multiply both sides by the average value of θ and divide by the average value of gross 
imports (M ) we get 







⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ∂∂
≡= − = − ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ∂∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ M ⎟
                                                
 (A.2) 
where ξMθ is the elasticity of gross imports with respect to pollution costs, and ξXθ is the 
elasticity of gross exports with respect to pollution costs.  Note our prior is that ξMθ is positive 




27 Worse still, if an industry imports and exports the same amount, net imports are zero, and any measured elasticity 
will be infinite.  Moreover, if the increase in pollution costs at home causes net imports to increase from a large 
negative number to a small negative number, the measured elasticity of net imports will be negative.   On the other hand, if we divide  by the average value of gross exports ( X  rather than 
M ) we get 







⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ∂∂
≡= − = − ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
ξ  (A.3) 
Both ξ1 and ξ2 approximate the sum of the absolute values of the elasticities of imports and 
exports with respect to pollution costs.  If net imports are positive (M X > ), then ξ1<ξ2, ξ1 
understates this sum of elasticities, and ξ2 overstates the sum.  If net imports are negative, then 
ξ1>ξ2, ξ1 overstates the sum of elasticities, and ξ2 understates it.   
 The  statistics  ξ1 and ξ2 have several nice properties.  They provide bounds for a sensible 
magnitude with which to interpret the coefficient  ˆ α .  They are comparable across sets of 
countries.  And, if M X = , the two statistics are identical and equal to the sum of the import and 
export elasticities: ξ1=ξ2=ξMθ+ξXθ . 




Table 1. Comparisons of pollution abatement operating costs (PAOC) and net 
imports: 1977-1986. 
 
Average net imports divided by 
value shipped in the U.S. 
 
PAOC/ value 








Cross-section comparison of levels. 








20 3-digit SIC codes with the lowest 












20 3-digit SIC codes with the 














Time-series comparison of changes. 





Change in average net imports 
divided by value shipped 
 
20 3-digit SIC codes for which 












20 3-digit SIC codes for which 











The top panel contains average values over the entire 1977-86 period.  The bottom panel 
reports the changes, the difference between the average values from 1986 and the average 
values from 1977. 
*Indicates that the relevant figures for clean and dirty industries are statistically different from 
each other at 5 percent.  (
†Statistically significant at 10 percent.) 
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics  1977-1986. 
 
 
   
Mean and std. deviation 
 




PAOC by U.S. industries 





Value added by U.S. industries 
(millions $ 1982) 
 




Value shipped by U.S. industries 
(millions $ 1982) 
 










































Net imports divided by U.S. value 









The sample is 1015 observations on 133 industries over 10 years. (1979 is omitted because 
the PACE data are not available for that year.) 
Trade data for the OECD in column (3) excludes imports and exports from Canada and 
Mexico.  Column (4) comprises of non-OECD countries that are GATT signatories.  































Pollution abatement operating 










































Sargan overidentification test. 









Elasticity of net imports with respect to changes in 




       -- based on exports (ξ2): 










*Statistically significant at 5 percent. 
†Statistically significant at 10 percent. 
Heteroskedastic-consistent std. errors in parentheses.   
All columns contain year and industry fixed effects. 
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Table 4.  Predicted pollution abatement costs 1977-1986. 
 
  Pollution abatement operating costs per dollar of value added. 






Using all states 
(3) 
 

















State level pollution concentrations
 
 

































































































































*Statistically significant at 5 percent. 
†Significant at 10 percent.  Std. errors in parentheses. 
Contains 130 industry fixed effects and 9 year fixed effects. Table 5.  Robustness checks: Alternative instrumental variables 
regressions of U.S. trade with fixed effects.  1977-1986. 
 
 
Coefficients on instrumented PAOC as a fraction 

































Without industries that are 










With border states 










With oil prices interacted 








      
 
*Statistically significant at 5 percent. 
†Statistically significant at 10 percent. 
Heteroskedastic-consistent std. errors in parentheses.   
All regressions contain year dummies, industry fixed effects, and tariff levels, as in 





39Appendix table A1.  Magnitudes. 
 
Predicted change in net imports due to increased pollution 
abatement costs ($1982 millions) 
 







Average of the 20 industries whose pollution 


























































      
Notes:  Each predicted change in imports is the coefficient estimate, times the 
increase in pollution abatement costs for the average industry, times the 
average value shipped.  For example, the fixed effects coefficient for trade with 
Mexico from table 3 is 0.064.  On average, for the 20 industries whose pollution 
abatement costs increased most, PAC divided by value added increased by 
0.028.  Those same industries' average value shipped was $21 billion.  Multiply 
the three numbers to get $38 million, the top figure in column (1). 
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Coefficients on instrumented PAOC as a fraction of U.S. value added
 





















































































































































*Statistically significant at 5 percent.  
†Statistically significant at 10 percent. 
Heteroskedastic-consistent std. errors in parentheses.   









(;,* ) η ττ Γ  
η2  -
x1 and x2  industry groups 
These industries are 
produced abroad and 
imported to home. 
These industries are 
produced at home and 






Industries, ranked by pollution intensity. Figure 1b.  The effect of an increase in pollution taxes on abatement costs. 
 
 
0 (; ,* ) η ττ Γ  
1 η
xi industry group 






Industries, ranked by pollution intensity. 
 






74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
Manufacturing sector
Using 1974 composition of 2-digit industries
Using 1974 composition of 3-digit industries
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